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ABSTRACT. This paper examines the recent emergence, on the periphery of Hanoi,
of large real estate projects that began construction during the 2000s but have now
remained unfinished or, even when completed, largely uninhabited. These “ghost urban
areas,” as the local press calls them, epitomize some of the problems which emerged in
Hanoi when a model of urban development that aimed at realizing an imagined urban
future, formulated by state planning agencies, encountered the highly speculative reality
of Vietnam’s property market. Ghost urban areas reveal how the state’s planning
orientations and discourse—conveying ideals of urban “modernity,” “civility,” and
particularly “synchrony”—instead generated dysfunctional, incomplete, and disconnected
places. Based on a survey of thirty-nine ghost urban areas, a cartographic analysis,
interviews with key actors, and a critical study of policy documents, this paper reveals
multiple scales and forms of what we call “asynchronous territorial developments.”
Around Hanoi, these developments involve vast tracts of agricultural lands forcibly
appropriated yet left fallow, planned infrastructure and amenities that stay unbuilt for
indefinite periods of time, and housing units transacted multiple times among speculators
but have remained largely uninhabited and out of reach for a majority of urban
households. Ultimately, we interrogate how these various territorial asynchronies, both
generated by and plaguing ghost urban areas, shape their livability and inhabitants’
experience.
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INTRODUCTION
The appearance of so-called ghost cities in Asia has garnered a great deal
of media attention lately. In recent years, the emphasis has mainly been
on China (e.g., Daily Mail Reporter 2010; Yung 2014; Shepard 2015),
although ghost cities also emerged in other parts of East and Southeast
Asia at various points in the last three decades, such as in the wake of
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the 1997 Asian economic crisis (e.g., Sheng and Kirinpanu 2000; Sajor
2003; Firman 2004). What is less well known is that an analogous
phenomenon has recently emerged in Vietnam. On the periphery of
Hanoi, the city on which this paper focuses, several large real estate
projects were approved and began construction during the 2000s but
have now remained unfinished or, even when completed, largely
uninhabited. The domestic press refers to these places as “abandoned
projects” ( ) or, using an especially potent neologism, as
“ghost urban areas” ( ).
A small number of studies have explored the ghost city phenomenon
in developing East and Southeast Asia, with a focus in recent years on
China (e.g., Chi et al. 2015; Woodworth 2012; Sorace and Hurst
2016). Much of this literature takes either a descriptive approach to the
study of ghost cities (attempting to quantify, characterize, or map
them) or propose financial-economic analyses emphasizing the role of
property bubbles and their underlying causes (financialization of real
estate, lax domestic credit policies, rampant speculation, etc.). We
acknowledge the value of these approaches and recognize that ghost
cities throughout rapidly urbanizing Asia are often outcomes of the
speed and relative newness of development, coupled with the
inexperience of development companies and market volatility (cf. Mera
and Renaud 2000).
In this paper, we suggest that a fuller understanding of the ghost
city phenomenon in developing East and Southeast Asia requires a
broadening of analytical perspectives. It calls, in particular, for greater
attention to the mediating role of the state during successive stages of
the urban development process. In positioning the state more centrally
in the analysis, we agree with conceptualizations of Asian urbanism as
a phenomenon shaped by governmental attempts to put urbanization,
particularly the urban space production processes, in the service of
nation-building objectives (MacKinnon 2011; Yooil 2012; Shatkin
2017). In line with this view, we apprehend failed enclave urbanism
through the notion, put forth by Sorace and Hurst (2016, 305) in
reference to China, of the “ideological commitments” by states to
rapidly modernize national territories and society by gearing rapidly
growing cities toward an imagined urban modernity.
In what follows, we explore the relationship between this
ideological commitment and the emergence of ghost urban areas in
Hanoi. We do so through the lens of the ideal city discourse put
forward by the state (and to an extent by developers too) to foster and
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justify the particular form it wishes Vietnam’s planned urban expansion
to take. In taking this approach, our purpose is less to characterize
Hanoi’s failed peri-urban enclaves (although we do sketch a portrait of
the phenomenon) or to identify the financial and economic factors
that led to them (although we take these factors into consideration).
Rather, we interpret Hanoi’s ghost urban areas as one of the most
problematic expressions of a vast state-led project to put the post-
 urbanization process in the service of national development and
modernization, notably through the production of master-planned
communities.
In this paper, Hanoi’s ghost urban areas are understood as failed
outcomes of a model of urban development central to state planners’
urbanization-as-modernization strategy, the so-called new urban areas
( —hereafter NUA). These are large-scale peri-urban land
redevelopments dominated by the residential function, which may
also include commercial spaces, high-rise office towers, private amenities
(e.g., schools and medical clinics), and exclusive recreational spaces
(e.g., golf courses, fitness centers). NUAs are mainly developed for
profit by private corporate actors (sometimes in partnership with local
governments). Most projects are geared toward the rising professional
and middle classes, although some of them include resettlement and
social housing (Labbé and Boudreau 2011; Tran 2015).
For two decades now, the post-reform Vietnamese state has been
promoting this model as a means of encouraging domestic and foreign
corporate actors to build large, mixed-use compounds and infrastructure
at the periphery of existing cities. These new peri-urban spaces are
meant to accommodate growing urban population, produce more and
better infrastructure, and ultimately make space for a new urban-
industrial economy. NUAs’ role, however, goes beyond these functional
and economic transformations. Within broader national modernization
ambitions pursued by the Vietnamese state, NUAs also ought to act
as catalysts and receptacles of an imagined urban modernity.
Various ambitions are entrusted to NUAs to realize this goal.
Among them, NUAs are expected to assemble the conditions of a so-
called urban synchrony ( ). Put simply, this means that the
vast estates planned and built on the city’s periphery should rise from
the ground fully formed rather than incrementally. By the time
residents move in, they should find a functionally balanced and
complete living environment that meets all their needs while also being
socially and technically in sync with the rest of the city. The case of
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ghost urban areas, explored in the rest of this paper, shows that, in
contrast to this purported role as vectors of urban cohesion and
completeness, NUAs can—and do—generate various socio-spatial
disconnections and shortcomings.
We call this phenomenon “asynchronous territorial development”
and show that it is multiform and multi-scalar. A first and most
obvious material-functional asynchrony is observable in large ghost
projects that have forcibly appropriated and leveled vast tracts of
agricultural land without redeveloping them. Such idle projects are
not only wasting productive croplands but also failing to produce the
infrastructure and amenities needed by preexisting peri-urban
populations. On a smaller scale, a similar form of material-functional
asynchrony is observable within those projects that are largely built but
where occupancy rates are very low and basic services lacking. Another
form of aesthetic-cultural asynchrony emerges from the promotion of
selective enclaves of new lifestyles, leading to social estrangement from
the existing, vernacular city. Finally, a financial-economic form of
asynchrony results from rampant speculative practices that keep NUA
housing out of reach of a majority of urbanites. This influences owner-
occupiers’ views of their living environment, which they tend to assess
through exchange rather than use value criteria.
Ghost urban areas are certainly not representative of all NUAs.
These deviant cases instead epitomize the gaps that have opened up
between the ideal city imagined by the state and the actual urban spaces
produced on the urban periphery. The exploration of these gaps (or
asynchrony) in this paper relies on data collected as part of a wider
project on Hanoi’s peri-urban development conducted between 2013
and 2016. This includes a database of Hanoi’s NUAs, which allowed
the identification of thirty-nine ghost urban areas. Through secondary
documents, field visits, and a survey questionnaire administered to
occupants, we characterized each of these projects in terms of land
surface and usage, completion and occupancy rates, and planned versus
built infrastructure and facilities. We further draw on interviews
conducted with a dozen individuals involved within local and national
governments, the real estate industry, and academia and with owner-
occupiers in three of Hanoi’s most problematic ghost urban areas.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Part 1 discusses key
components of the Vietnamese state’s ideological commitment to
modernize the country through planned urban developments. We
focus, in particular, on the notion of “urban synchrony,” a key element
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in the official urban modernization agenda that new urban areas are
supposed to realize. Part 2 sketches a portrait of Hanoi’s NUAs. Using
the case of ghost urban areas, we show how this predominant model
of urban development fails to meet the state’s ideal city discourse. We
demonstrate that an asynchronous city is emerging around Hanoi with
deficiencies that cut across scales: from the micro-local shortcomings
of individual projects to macro-territorial land wastage on the
metropolitan scale. Part 3 explores the skewing of housing markets
spurred by NUAs and its effects on owner-occupiers’ mind-set. This
discussion focuses on the urban experience of households inhabiting
three of Hanoi’s most dramatic and dysfunctional ghost urban areas.
Ultimately, we show that the modernizing ambitions entrusted by
the state to NUAs could simply not withstand the highly speculative
and corrupted reality of Vietnam’s property market. In this context,
the state has tended to confine its role to the discursive realm.
Incidentally, weak state controls during project implementation and
commercialization have allowed speculative practices to have a much
greater influence on the structuring of Hanoi’s periphery than the
modernity and synchrony ideals that NUAs were supposed to deliver.
URBAN MACHINES THAT WORK
The central governments of developing Asian countries have long
linked planned urban development to overarching agendas of national
modernization (Woodside 1998; MacKinnon 2011; Yooil 2012).
Since the 1980s, many national governments in the region fostered the
production of large master-planned communities, effectively renewing
the parameters of this modernization-urban planning linkage (Phillips
and Yeh 1987; Shatkin 2017; Keeton 2011). In the context of
extremely rapid economic growth and integration into a global
economic system, national governments used this strategy to enroll
corporate actors in a state-backed experiment with global influences,
private forms of planning, neoliberal modes of governance, new forms
of citizenship, and the production of new urban built forms (Shatkin
2017; Roy and Ong 2011). As they “rose in the East,” to borrow
Keeton’s (2011) words, central states tried to use “Asian new towns”
as a means of channeling and mediating global capitalist forces while
continuing to pursue national modernization ideals.
The NUA model of urban development in Vietnam is no exception.
In the 1990s, as urbanization began to accelerate, state planners
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formulated and entrenched this new model of (peri-)urban development
into the national planning framework. New urban areas rapidly became
an important component of large cities’ master plans. Echoing
arguments put forth by states elsewhere in the region, Vietnam’s
national leaders and government planning agencies (the Ministry of
Construction in particular) argued that this new urban development
model could solve important problems faced by Vietnamese cities.
NUAs, these actors explained, would not only help relieve housing
shortages but also, through land-based-financing methods, serve as a
leverage to upgrade and expand infrastructure (especially roads) (see
Labbé and Musil 2014 for further discussion).
Hanoi’s planning authorities did succeed in attracting investments
in the production of NUAs, and avoided to further burden the state’s
limited budget. During the 2000s, over two hundred projects were
licensed on the province’s territory. While a majority of projects were
invested by domestic firms, many of them indirectly tapped into
foreign capital. In that sense, the Vietnamese state managed to channel
global capitalist forces into a new urban form. As mentioned in the
introduction and further discussed in the next section, the NUA
model of urban development is not only meant to generate more
housing and produce new and better infrastructure around existing
cities. This model is also—and perhaps as importantly—expected to
engineer a new, modern urban future. Planning authorities did much
more poorly on that front. But before we get into that discussion, let’s
first describe the state-defined ideals that NUAs were meant to
materialize.
An Urban Ideal Triptych
In both policy texts and the media, this transformative purpose of
NUAs is most often conveyed by three ubiquitous terms: “modern/
modernity” ( ), “civilization/civility” ( ), and “synchrony”
( ). These terms are regularly used to characterize the ideal
Vietnamese city imagined by the state. In fact, their pervasiveness in
policy documents has turned them into a prominent triptych of urban
ideals, or ideological commitments toward a better urban future, made
by Vietnamese planning authorities in view of a rapidly urbanizing
population.
NUAs are but one of the many mechanisms used by the state to
foster the two first components of the urban ideal triptych—that is,
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modernity and civility. A wide range of state-led development plans,
programs, and campaigns seek to modernize and civilize various aspects
of the nation, from its economy to its customs and culture. NUAs,
however, play a specific role in the state’s vast national betterment
enterprise: they are envisioned as a means to modernize the Vietnamese
space-economy by turning agrarian territories into areas for urban-
industrial usage (Van Suu 2009a). They are also seen as the vectors of
a new “urban civility” ( ), fit for the post-doi moi era
(Harms 2009, 2014a). As explained by Harms (2009, 183), urban
civility campaigns in Vietnam have long sought to construct the moral
parameters of the “civilized” or “cultured” person. More recently, these
campaigns also championed the idea of “urban order” ( ) to
mitigate unmodern urban forms and practices (e.g., self-built housing,
street vending, the parking of vehicles on sidewalks, etc.).
It is nevertheless the third component of Vietnam’s triptych of
urban ideals, the so-called quality of urban synchrony ( ),
that new urban areas ought potently to actualize. The Vietnamese term
“ ,” translated in this paper as “synchrony,” combines two closely
related ideas: “ ,” which refers to the action of bringing similar
individual units together, and “ ,” which refers to the articulation of
different elements so that they function as a whole, like soldiers
forming an army or the built components of a machine.
The ideal of urban synchrony can be traced back to the earliest
policy texts about NUAs and has since remained an important
guideline in the state’s discourse about this model of urban development.
At the most basic level, this notion entails the compliance and
compatibility of projects with official urban development plans. It also
calls for the production of complete neighborhoods wherein housing
areas are served by all the “technical infrastructure” (roads, energy and
water provision networks, etc.) and “social infrastructure” (schools,
clinics, public spaces) needed “to ensure a stable life and convenient
living and working conditions for the people” (Hanoi People’s
Committee 2001). All of these components further need to be built
in full, simultaneously, and on time. Moreover, synchronized projects
need to have “efficient” and “sustainable” connections not only
internally but also with the rest of the city (Ministry of Construction
2008b).
The language of urban synchrony put forth by the state is further
relayed by developers. It regularly features in the promotional materials
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that they produced to advertise their projects to buyers. For instance,
the promotional website of the Nghia Ðô NUA emphasizes the “high
value” of its “works and architectural space synchronization” (HICC1
2011). The North QL32 NUA is similarly marketed as a “different
ideal living space . . . because it is a complete urban area with modernly
synchronized technical infrastructure, social infrastructure, [and]
landscape architecture” (Lideco 2016).
An Ideal City Away from the Existing City
As suggested by the above-cited ads, the notion of urban synchrony
goes beyond the objective of developing functional urban environments
by ensuring that the various parts and functions of NUA projects are
built simultaneously and assembled like clockworks. Lurking behind
these functional intentions is the promise of a reformed urbanity—a
new (modern and civilized) city that will avoid the shortcomings and
dysfunctions (or asynchrony) of the existing city. As promised in an
advertisement for a large redevelopment project to the West of Hanoi
called Splendora, NUAs will be like a “new sun” rising on Vietnam’s
urban future (see figure 1).
The promise of a new urbanity is expressed through implicit and
explicit rejections of the urban conditions that prevail in the inner city
and in unplanned peri-urban zones. In both developers’ advertisements
and state policies, NUAs’ “modernist logics of planning, efficiency,
order, and ‘urban civility’” (Harms 2016, 21) are contrasted with the
“other” urbanities of the inner city and its self-built edges, condemned
as retrograde, uncivilized, and asynchronous. Already by the mid-
1990s, Hanoi’s planning authorities issued a document that specified
how NUAs would avoid replicating the weaknesses of the existing
vernacular city. To this end, this document required that new urban
areas (a) be high-density neighborhoods but less so than the overcrowded
city core, (b) develop infrastructure and green spaces (lacking in the
inner city) that meet international planning standards, (c) have their
roads entirely constructed by developers rather than by local inhabitants
as in self-built urban zones, and (d) avoid pitfalls faced by the Soviet-
inspired collective housing built prior to the reforms by carefully
coordinating the integration of a diversity of functions within projects
(Hanoi People’s Committee 1995).
Another telling example of this approach is found in a 2008
circular (15/2008/TT-BXD) of the Ministry of Construction (2008a)
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that stipulates what is an exemplar ( ) NUA. The listed criteria
insist on the importance of a controlled aesthetic, calling for uniform,
ordered, and harmonious buildings (art. 3a); aesthetically balanced
green spaces and street trees (art. 2e); and regulated outdoor
advertisement boards (in terms of positioning, size, and color) (art. 2i).
All of these characteristics stand in obvious opposition to the supposedly
unaesthetic vernacular built forms of the existing city with its
hodgepodge of architectural styles, self-constructed billboards, awnings,
and porch roofs.
Here again, developers echo state planners’ discourse. The rejection
of the existing city is a selling point in their marketing of NUAs. To give
only one particularly telling example, an ad for the NUA Splendora
states: “Our goal is to build a convenient new city for transportation
with synchronous design; a distinction compared to the old-quarter,
the center of Hanoi” (Splendora 2016). A few developers have in fact
pushed this desire for distinction beyond negations of the vernacular
Vietnamese city by promoting their projects as “Westernized” living
environments. For instance, three projects on the city’s southwestern
periphery (respectively called M  Lao NUA, Phu My-Dream Home,
and the Goldsilk Complex) are marketed as constituting a “European
space in the heart of Hanoi.” The Splendora project mentioned above
is similarly heralded by its developer as “on par with economic centers
such as New York, a center of fashion and culture as Paris, a center for
tourism and recreation as in Dubai or Sydney; a symbol of global life”
(Splendora 2016).
In these examples, social and urban distinctiveness is bolstered by
developers with images of sophistication and wealth, aspirations that
dovetail neatly with the ideals of modernity and civility promoted by
the state. However, rather than synchronizing the new planned
environment with their milieu, these distinctive living environments
generate a form of cultural disconnection, an aesthetic estrangement
from the rest of the city. As Waibel (2006, 47) puts it: “The ambivalent
wishes of simultaneous distinction from other societal groups and
integration into a specific lifestyle or peer group are served by the new
urban areas, which are developing into selective vanishing spaces within
the city.”
In these different ways, the NUA model is branded as the promise
of a better urban future—one that reorders the existing city by negating
it. In new urban areas, state and developers pledge, homogeneity will
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organize, planning will supersede spontaneity, and civility will generate
new lifestyles fit for a developed nation. Assessing whether this
Vietnamese triptych of urban ideals is in fact realized by NUAs is a
challenging task, especially given the vague and largely immaterial
character of the Vietnamese notions of modernity, civility, and
synchrony. As we will see in the next section, a portrait of Hanoi’s ghost
urban areas begins to delineate tangible scenes of asynchrony between
the built form and these ideological commitments.
HANOI’S GHOST URBAN AREAS: PORTRAIT OF AN
ASYNCHRONOUS CITY
Between 1994 and 2015, 252 NUA projects were approved on
Hanoi’s territory (see figure 2). The deployment of this model of urban
development across the province was particularly intensive between
2003 and 2009. Nearly half of Hanoi’s NUAs (129 projects) were
approved during this urban property boom. Echoing the earlier
experiences of other cities in developing Southeast Asia (e.g., Sajor
2003; Mera and Renaud 2000; Sheng and Kirinpanu 2000), Hanoi’s
boom was spurred by a combination of factors including years of
sustained national economic growth, deregulation of the commercial
banking sector, and the country’s entry into the World Trade
Organization, which was followed by massive private capital inflow
into the country.
NUAs became attractive investment opportunities for foreign and
domestic investors, as demonstrated by the large number of projects
approved during the six years of the boom. However, when both
domestic credits and foreign capital inflows suddenly dried up, in
2008–2009, investors and developers had no choice but to dramatically
slow or scale down NUA projects. By the late 2009, the construction
of many redevelopments had come to a full stop, leaving entire sectors
unbuilt or with only bare-shell buildings.
The ghost urban areas of Hanoi are, in large part, the result of this
property market bust. At the time of our survey, in the summer of
2016, about a third Hanoi’s NUAs were still under construction while
another half had yet to break ground. Within the remaining projects,
a small subset (about thirty-four) could be considered completed. The
rest were either under construction or, as is the case with the thirty-nine
ghost urban areas portrayed in this section, had seen their construction
halted and were standing idle. These stalled projects shed a crude light
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on the ways in which a volatile economic environment derailed the
state’s ambitions to use planned property development as a means of
modernizing the country’s cities.
Inside Ghost Urban Areas: Phantom Materiality
and Visible Absences
The uninhabited residential units in ghost urban areas are perhaps the
most visible marker of the erosion of NUAs’ intentions, as originally
defined by state planning agencies. As shown in figure 3, by 2016, only
56 percent (or thirty-nine thousand) of all the residential units planned
 
Figure 2. Thirty-nine ghost urban areas in Hanoi (black), amongst 252 NUA projects 
approved between 1994 and 2015. Source: Authors 
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in ghost projects had been built. By then, 47 percent of these built
units were unoccupied, a rate that reaches a confounding 65 percent
if we only consider single family housing types. This represents a total
of over nine thousand uninhabited townhouses and detached houses
called “villas” in Vietnam.
These low occupancy rates can partly be explained by severe
infrastructural deficiencies. Taken as a whole, 25 percent of the land
allocated to Hanoi’s ghost urban areas lack a proper road network (see
figure 4), a situation that greatly limits access to them. Such
infrastructural shortcomings match assessments by the domestic press
according to which some NUAs have become isolated and disconnected
from the rest of the city (Anh and VnMedia 2012). This situation is
aggravated by the fact that two in every five ghost urban area projects
are fenced, gated, or both. Other shortcomings plague portions of
these projects where a functional road networks has been built. Most
importantly, less than half of the land originally planned in these zones
for nonresidential buildings and amenities (e.g., offices, schools,
hospital, commercial areas, green spaces, etc.) was developed at the
time of our survey.
These absences greatly reduce ghost urban areas’ livability. A survey
questionnaire administered to 141 residents shows that a vast majority
deplore the lack of public services, facilities, and infrastructure in the
NUA where they live. Many mentioned the discrepancy between the
current situation and the developers’ promises of complete and
synchronized urban places, as advertised in master plans and promotional
materials. Residents also resent the lack of public facilities in their
vicinity and complain about having to rely instead on unofficial services
and amenities such as small private kindergartens, noodle shops, or
fresh vegetable stalls informally set up by neighbors in their houses or
by temporary occupants and squatters in unoccupied buildings.
The situation in ghost urban areas echoes broader infrastructural
shortcomings observed in the rest of Hanoi’s NUAs. Here again, the
reality of project implementation betrays the state’s ideals and discourse
about NUAs’ unique ability to produce functionally “complete”
urban environments. A critical assessment of the production of
amenities and infrastructure in purportedly completed NUAs, conducted
by the Association of Cities of Vietnam, concluded that “none . . . have
used land according to approved plans, especially with regard to basic
[physical and social] infrastructure systems like schools, medical
facilities, markets and space for community activities” (Vu 2011, 1).
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Moreover, as experts interviewed for this project remarked, when social
infrastructure do get built in NUAs, they often take the form of private
and exclusive services instead of the public amenities originally planned.
This situation is not only problematic for the residents of deficient
NUAs but also for surrounding populations living in spontaneously
urbanized zones, which state planners originally expected would be
able to access the amenities and services featured in NUAs’ master plans
(interviews, Hanoi, December 19 and 21, 2016).
“Wasted” Productive Landscapes
Another major discrepancy between the state’s territorial synchrony
ideals and the actual implementation of NUAs concerns the land
conversion process. Most of Hanoi’s NUAs are built on large tracts of
forcibly appropriated farming land situated in densely settled territories.
We estimate that, over the last two decades or so, land-grabbing for
these redevelopments has dispossessed approximately 130,000
households of access to croplands on which they held use rights. Taken
alone, the ghost urban areas identified in this study occupy 1,490
hectares and have prevented approximately 7,400 households from
having access to croplands. Yet, at the time of our survey, nearly 80
percent of this once productive agricultural territory was either leveled
but unbuilt (937 hectares) or occupied by uninhabited housing units
(213 hectares).
As the recent literature on land takings for urban development in
Vietnam shows, agricultural land expropriations destabilize preexisting
socioeconomic dynamics, leading in many cases to the impoverishment
of the surrounding peri-urban populations (Van Suu 2009a, 2009b;
DiGregorio 2011; Labbé 2015). For peasants, this situation is harder
to bear when the project for which they lost their land stays undeveloped
or uninhabited for extended periods, as is the case with ghost urban
areas. Years after years, as emphasized in the domestic press, these
people watch the rich and productive lands ( ) that they
used to farm lying unused and yet they cannot bring it back into
cultivation, if only temporarily, since developers purposefully level
fields and destroy their irrigation systems as soon as they get their hands
on them (VIR 2015; Ðai doàn ket 2014). In the words of a Vietnamese
blogger, ghost urban areas “are turning agrarian territories into dead
land regions ( )” (Lê 2015).
In his work on Ho Chi Minh City, Erik Harms (2012, 2014b) has
described the process of state-sponsored peri-urban land redevelopment
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as “clearing the wastelands” ( ). “Lands slated for
development,” he writes, “are imagined and described as empty
wastelands even when they are already inhabited and being used for
productive purposes” (Harms 2014b, 313). Bui et al. (2010) similarly
argue that Vietnamese policies treat farmlands as an underused or low-
yielding resource whose full value can only be unlocked by redevelopment
into more profitable urban-industrial functions. As Labbé (2016, 154)
puts it, the state’s discourse on the need to make space for projects such
as NUAs seeks to diminish “the harm done to the dispossessed . . . by
suggesting [that their use of the land] was of little good anyway.”
Planning authorities give away peri-urban agricultural land to
developers and, in doing so, put an end to associated livelihoods in the
name of functional efficiency and economic modernization. The
official discourse on NUAs negates vernacular territorial dynamics by
turning attention away from the needs of peri-urban population and,
instead, toward the potentialities of purportedly empty spaces. But as
demonstrated by the case of ghost urban areas, the reality of project
implementation is at odd with this justificatory discourse. In an
attempt to explain this problematic outcome, the next section
discusses the capitalist market logic embodied by ghost urban areas and
ways in which it eroded, co-opted, and ultimately stripped NUAs of
their ability to materialize the state’s ideals of urban modernity, civility,
and synchrony.
SPECULATING ON URBANITY: THE FINANCIAL
UNDERSIDE OF NUAS
Hanoi’s NUAs are not only socially and spatially laid out as isolated
(sometimes gated) enclaves of new urban expectations. They also feed
into what we could call a market asynchrony that orients housing
production away from the needs of the vast majority of Hanoi’s
households. To understand this situation, we need to look at the role
of the rampant real estate speculation practices that have defined the
urban property market, which reemerged in Vietnam during the
reforms. As we will see, hundreds of abandoned houses have become
capitalist accumulation spaces—with hundreds of housing units being
actively transacted by actors who will never live there. The material and
psychological outcomes of these speculative practices pushes NUAs’
urbanity further away from the state’s ideals (see figure 5).
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Supply/Demand Asymmetry
In an environment marked by corrupted and lax planning controls
(Labbé and Musil 2014), the central and local states in Vietnam have
been, by and large, unable to control problematic developer behaviors.
This includes a tendency to produce NUA properties meeting their
own financial interests and those of property speculators rather than
complying with planning policies or developing accessible or livable
places for future user-occupiers. Three main problems have emerged in
NUAs in general and in ghost urban areas in particular that demonstrate
weak state controls during the implementation and commercialization
of projects.
The first problem concerns the unaffordability of housing built in
NUAs. A high-ranking official from the Ministry of Natural Resources
and Environment (MoNRE) estimates that only 20 percent of the
urban population can afford 80 percent of the housing formally
produced in Hanoi’s NUAs (interview, Hanoi, July 5, 2013). Illustrating
this gap, the average annual income per capita in Vietnam was about
USD 1,900 in 2013, whereas townhouses in NUAs were selling at
between USD 1,400 and USD 5,600 per square meter (H ng and
VietnamNet 2014). Property values in NUAs are so high compared to
the financial capacities of households, a strategist active in the Vietnamese
banking sector remarked, that they have remained unaffordable even
during the major economic downturn of the late 2000s when they
dropped by 40–50 percent (interview, Skype, June 16, 2013).
The second problem, closely connected to the first, concerns the
type and size of housing units. Because they generated the highest and
fastest return on investment throughout the 2000s, high-end properties
and units with the largest square-footage came to dominate the formal
property market. By the early 2010s, detached villas (120–800 square
meters in size and selling for USD 150,000–4.5 million) and townhouses
(50–200 square meters in size and selling for USD 70,000–1.1
million) proved to be completely disconnected from the average urban
household’s purchasing power. Moreover, at the height of the urban
property boom (circa 2006–2008), planning authorities turned a
blind eye on developers slashing down on essential elements of
approved plans that could not be sold. A senior state planner
interviewed for this study explained that these elements included
access and internal roads, public spaces, and schools (interview, Hanoi,
June 13, 2016).
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The third problem, discussed earlier, relates to developers’ tendency
to delay considerably or even forsake the construction of amenities and
infrastructure in NUA projects. The result can be glaring as is the case
with three of Hanoi’s most problematic land redevelopments, the Vân
Canh (see figure 6), Lideco, and Geleximco NUAs, to which we shall
come back below. These projects have very low occupancy rates and are
plagued by major infrastructural shortcomings. They only have small
access roads, their inner road systems are incomplete, and they offer few
if any amenities. This is despite the fact that their housing production
and sales (almost exclusively villas and townhouses) are well under way.
During the property market frenzy of the late 2000s, these
problems had limited implications for buyers and developers. As
remarked by a local real estate consultant, “buyers’ expectations [then]
were not oriented toward [actual] real estate products. Rather, homes
were seen only as an investment opportunity” (interview, Hanoi, June
10, 2016). Both developers and speculators had lost sight of issues
related to the quality of the housing and to the livability of the built
environment produced, commercialized, and transacted. But when
the property market began to cool down (circa 2009), Hanoi was left
with dozens of NUAs offering only high-end and very large housing
units completely at odd with the financial means and needs of the vast
majority of urbanites looking for an actual place to live.
This is a grave issue not only due to the important housing needs
that remain unmet in Hanoi but also in terms of the capital sunk into
failed real estate projects. As emphasized in a recent governmental
report, as of late Feburary 2014, unoccupied houses represented an
estimated USD 4.3 billion on the national scale and USD 4 billion in
Hanoi alone (DtiNews 2014). As our MoNRE informant emphasized,
rather than participating in the strengthening of the national economy,
these investments immobilized capital that could have supported
industrial development while also wasting precious land resources
(interview, Hanoi, July 5, 2013). Worse still, developers’ massive
defaults on loan repayments since 2009 have shackled state and
commercial banks in Vietnam with bad debts that continue to drag
down national economic growth to this day (see, for instance,
IntellAsia.net 2015).
The Vietnamese state did try to fix these problems, generated both
by property developers’ behaviors and by the real estate crash of the late
2000s. Since 2009, the Hanoi Department of Natural Resources and
Environment has been periodically investigating stalled NUA projects.
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Since then, it issued decisions to revoke over seventeen million square
meters of land but only four hundred thousand square meters had
actually been taken back by early 2015 (VIR 2015). In 2013, an
economic stimulus package of USD 1.41 billion, controlled by the
Vietnamese central bank, offered long-term, low-interest loans to those
developers who build new social housing or convert commercial
buildings, especially in stalled projects, into social housing. Three years
later, less than half of the envelope had been disbursed and most of it
had been allocated to the construction of new projects rather than the
transformation of problematic ones, such as ghost urban areas (Rodrigue
2016). Moreover, in an attempt to curb speculation, the Ministry of
Construction proposed in 2011 to substantially raise property taxes
rates on unbuilt lands and unfinished housing, an idea that has yet to
be integrated into policy.
None of these public measures have significantly resolved the
important problems posed by ghost urban areas in Hanoi. The state
indeed seems unable (or unwilling) to control the implementation and
commercialization stages of NUA development. This is despite the fact
that developers, in implementing projects, obviously strip this model
of urban development of much of its ability to attain the territorial
cohesiveness and completeness objectives so prominent in the state’s
general planning orientations and discourse.
Speculation and the Rationalization of Asynchronous Places
The financial component of the asynchronous territorial development
spurred by NUAs in general, and by ghost urban areas in particular, also
bears upon the experience of actual owner-occupiers. This comes
across clearly in exploratory interviews with residents in the three
previously mentioned ghost urban areas of Hanoi. These interviews
suggest that, rather than criticizing the absence of state-led
implementation mechanisms, or simply the developers for failing to
produce the ideal urban environments promised in policies and
promotional material, residents tend to rationalize their situation by
falling back on the exchange value of their property.
The thirteen owner-occupiers interviewed for this study bought
their homes after 2011–2012. As discussed earlier, this period was
marked by a significant housing price drop. Experts in the real estate
sectors told us that speculative transactions then came to a near halt.
For a rare moment in the post-reform period, most buyers of NUA
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properties in Hanoi then were households looking for an actual place
of residence. In contrast to speculators, these future occupiers paid
attention to developers’ reputation and to their reliability in building
NUAs in full and according to approved plans, and cared about the
livability of neighborhoods. For instance, one interviewee complained
about delays in the construction of a public space near his house.
Another lamented the low occupancy rate in his NUA. Another still
commented on the poor community life in his neighborhood
(interviews, Geleximco NUA and Vân Canh NUA, November 19,
2016).
Contrary to our expectation, such critiques about incompleteness,
deficiencies, and absences did not, however, figure very prominently in
residents’ answers. Obscuring obvious shortcomings of the
neighborhoods they inhabit, owner-occupiers’ preoccupations tended
to concern the profitability of their housing investment. The very
urban ideals of modernity, civility, and synchrony seemed to have
receded behind financial concerns, generating yet another form of
asynchrony on the household scale.
Illustrating this, some owner-occupiers downplayed the discrepancy
between the state’s propaganda and the developers’ marketing slogans,
or the specific promises of complete living environments made by
investors and the actual reality of inhabiting a ghost urban area. These
interviewees told us that these problems are not that bothersome given
that they bought their house at a “lower price.” This discounted price,
they explained, lowered their expectations toward their future place of
residence. Moreover, many mentioned that since property values have
gone up since they bought their property, they are, in the end quite
content with it.
Another telling example of residents’ investment-oriented mind-
set emerged when we asked them about the uninhabited or abandoned
( ) houses around them. Half of our interlocutors responded
that they did not get what we were talking about or else disagreed with
our use of the term “abandoned.” Some of them in fact corrected us,
stating that these houses were not abandoned at all since they had all
been sold. This is an apparent submission to the logic of property
speculation, a snub to the visible signs of abandonment: empty streets,
grass growing on porches, and moss covering the unplastered walls of
empty houses.
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CONCLUSION
At the entrance of some ghost urban areas surveyed in this study, an
ostentatious gateway marks the passage from the “existing city” to a
supposedly new, modern, civilized, and synchronized urban enclave.
Echoing the triptych of urban ideal so prominent in the state’s
discourse about NUAs, promotional billboards grace these gates that
forecast the beautification processes to come, sketching the spacious
contours of an imagined city with new urban functions and lifestyles.
Similar to other new town projects that emerged elsewhere in developing
East and Southeast Asia, NUAs disseminate the “images, dreams,
fantasies and desires of urban modernity [that] have colonized the
political imaginary [and] economic circuitry” (Sorace and Hurst 2016,
320). But in the case of ghost areas, these billboards and visions are now
weathered; the contours have faded and so is the urbanity promised by
state planning agencies.
The failed land redevelopments discussed in this paper may later
come back to life, following state sanctions or the next real estate
bubble. For now, however, these places reveal some of the problematic
outcomes of the state’s ideal city discourse with regard to NUAs, places
where homeowners would enjoy a fully finished quality home, in a
vibrant neighborhood, plugged on performing infrastructure, supplied
with adequate services and spaces, and benefiting from easy connections
to regional amenities. Few if any of Hanoi’s NUAs have fully realized
such promises, and ghost urban areas are a long way from there.
Instead, these places suffer from a technical-material form of asynchrony:
blocks after blocks of bare shell and unoccupied constructions, dirt
roads that do not connect, and hectares of erstwhile agricultural land
leveled but unused. Such severe infrastructural deficiencies undermine
the imagined urban future promised by the state. In the meantime, a
peasant visiting the land (and associated livelihood) forcibly taken away
from him would only find a few arrivistes enjoying the “the fresh
breathable air” of empty streets and the “peacefulness” of numerous
abandoned houses (interview, Geleximco NUA, November 19, 2016).
By looking at NUAs through the lens of the state discourse about
the ideal city they are supposed to actualize, this paper also revealed less
apparent form of aesthetic and socioeconomic asynchrony. NUAs are
conceived as enclaves of modernity, with formal and stylistic choices
that explicitly negate historical and vernacular forms of Vietnamese
urbanity. A strong speculative form of asynchrony is also sustained by
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another contextual negation: NUAs ignore the housing needs of
urbanites, syncing instead with the financial interests of a highly
volatile property market. In the late 2000s, the “property fever” was
such that developers and speculators lost sight of the actual use value
of homes and quality of urban environments to solely consider their
exchange value and investment profitability.
NUAs’ “ghostly” feel results from tensions at play when Hanoi’s
urban environment is speculated upon, when land transformation
promises synchronize only with half-baked urban productions, when
all shortfalls are still felt as spectral potentialities. Yet, the failures of
urban synchrony are rationalized by residents who tightly hold onto
their housing investment. Land productivity yields—in its goals, offer,
scale, and shape—to the demands of a small economic elite. Urban
ambitions toward modernity, civility, and synchrony are then draped
under a broad, state-sanctioned, and socio-spatial climate of speculative
risks and calculations, outweighing the necessary implementation of
such notions as urbanity, community, culture, or livelihoods.
As “new” ruins, ghost urban areas epitomize the velocity of Asia’s
urban growth: they are prodigious and decadent, excessive and
pragmatic, partly innovative but mostly manufactured.
Echoing this view, Antoine Picon (2000) opened his essay “Anxious
Landscapes: From the Ruin to Rust” with an outlook on the peri-
urban as a “territory of emptiness.” Echoing the case of NUAs, mainly
designed for speculative purposes, Picon highlights Le Corbusier’s
ambiguous distress in creating modern environments that would
become objects of consumerism. The ghost urban area’s incompleteness
might in fact be seen as truly modern: functionalism’s extreme
rationality is reactualized in an environment of economic calculations.
Yet the vital pulse of urbanity vanishes when lifestyles are rationalized
and idealized, when urban ecologies are ventured and speculated upon,
and when the resulting urban form is disconnected from its milieu.
In the meantime, the situation on-site offers a few moments of
spontaneous spatial reappropriations: fallow lands turned into vegetable
or herb gardens, street corners domesticated by tea stands, informal
pathways connecting unfinished roads, or empty ground floors hosting
casual billiard parlors and motorbike repair shops. In such scenes, the
ghost urban areas of Hanoi appear, once again, to be haunted back by
the very patterns of improvisation they vowed to eradicate. On a deeper
level, these scenes confirm the urban asynchrony uncovered by this
paper: idealistic, rationalistic, or speculative conceptions of space may
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fail to acknowledge the city as a space of fluidity and vibrations, a space
where multiple unpredictable convergences are in fact the ones that
sync with one another.
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